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Abstract 
Unintentional injury is now the principle cause of child death in developed nations, 
and the prevention of it has become a key focus of health professionals. This paper 
presents a sociological/philosophical enquiry into child accident prevention 
discourse and its implications for practice. With a critical distillation of major child 
accident prevention literature spanning the last two decades, significant findings, 
recommendations and themes are identified. It is observed which preventative 
measures have been deemed successful, with the placement of strategies into the 
appropriate ‘E’ category – education, engineering, enforcement, and environment. 
This process demonstrates the difficulties with and paradoxes inherent in the notion 
of accident prevention and buttresses a central hypothesis: that the child accident or 
injury in risk society is simultaneously predictable and random; knowable at a 
statistical level but enigmatic at an individual one. The accident, previously 
configured as unpredictable and inexplicable, has become wholly subject to risk 
society’s raison d’etre, the laws of probability, and is thus rendered predictable and 
preventable on a magnified scale. 
Keywords: accidentology, injury, prevention, rationality, risk, uncertainty 
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Resumen 
Los daños imprevistos son hoy en día la principal causa de muerte de niños y niñas 
en los países desarrollados, y su prevención se ha convertido en un aspecto central 
para los profesionales de la salud. Este artículo presenta una investigación filosófica 
y sociológica sobre el discurso de prevención de accidentes infantiles y sus 
implicaciones prácticas. A través de una síntesis crítica de la principal literatura en 
prevención de accidentes infantiles, el artículo identifica resultados, 
recomendaciones y temas significativos. Se observan qué medidas preventivas han 
resultado exitosas, situando las estrategias en la apropiada categoría 'E' -educación, 
ingeniería, ejecución y entorno. Este proceso demuestra las dificultades con, y las 
inherentes paradojas de, la noción de prevención de accidentes, y refuerza la 
hipótesis central: que los accidentes o daños infantiles en la sociedad del riesgo son 
simultáneamente predecibles y aleatorias; cognoscibles a nivel estadístico, aunque 
enigmáticas a nivel individual. El accidente, a priori establecido como impredecible 
e inexplicable, se ha convertido completamente en la razón de ser de la 
investigación de la sociedad del riesgo, en una cuestión de probabilidad, 
transformándose, de esta manera, en algo predecible y prevenible a nivel macro/ a 
gran escala. 
Palabras clave: accidentología, prevención de daños, racionalidad, riesgo, 
incertidumbre 
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ccidents retain a power to disturb simply as a reminder of the 
limits of rational cosmologies and of our tenuous control over the 
worlds that they describe 
– Judith Green, 1997a, p.34. 
 
Introduction 
 
The following pages present a sociological/philosophical enquiry into an 
area that is largely taken for granted; one usually considered ‘unquestionable 
and mundane’ (Green, 1997a). For sociology, the accident as it has typically 
been defined has not been of concern as it is not amenable to classical 
analysis. It is a marginal, random happening that when patterned ceases to be 
an accident. If a phenomenon has no discernible structure and is devoid of 
much agency, as the ‘ideal’ accident has been constructed, a sociological 
enquiry into such necessitates a novel approach
1
. The concept of the accident 
is discussed here, along with its treatment within the discourses of child 
accident prevention and risk. We also address the ways in which the concept 
of prevention is integral to risk society. 
 With childhood disease brought largely under control, unintentional 
injury is now the principle cause of child death in developed nations, and the 
prevention of it has become a key focus of health professionals. Yet the case 
can be made that rates have variously reduced, advances have been made, 
and that child injury deaths therefore represent a small and diminishing 
problem
2
. Nonetheless, it is child injuries per se, both mortality and 
morbidity rates, that is of current concern. This paper examines some of the 
developed world’s chief child injury/accident prevention literature, 
identifying key discursive elements and points of consensus. 
 While the term ‘accident’ has been replaced with ‘injury’ in most of the 
professional literature –a modification that will be inspected later– this paper 
uses the term ‘accident’ in an exercise of recuperation3. Use of the term is 
also necessary to chart its fall into disfavour and to demonstrate the 
paradigmatic shift from the certainty that characterised rational modernity to 
the attempts to control the uncertainties that characterise ‘high-modern’ risk 
society (Giddens, 1991).  
A 
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 The overall aim is to explore the extent to which ‘accident prevention’ is 
possible, and perhaps aid in the creation of a more authentic approach to 
child accident/injury prevention
4
, one that recognises the complexities and 
realities of the sometimes irrational and unpredictable everyday life that 
constitutes children’s (and adults’) interaction with their environment5. In 
other words, this study acknowledges that all risks to child safety can be 
only theoretically calculable; in practice, it shall be argued, there is still such 
an event as the accident. Prominent themes are rationality, risk, anxiety, 
uncertainty, and blame, with a cameo appearance by Sweden. 
 
The Literature 
 
This study undertakes a critical distillation of major child injury/accident 
findings and recommendations on an international developed-world level, 
identifying the significant themes that have emerged from child accident 
prevention literature spanning the last two decades. As a rather selectively 
random review, it will examine meta-reports from the United Nations 
Children’s Fund [UNICEF] (2001); the World Health Organization [WHO] 
(2008); the National Center for Injury Prevention and Control of the Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention [NCIPC-CDC] (2012); Safekids New 
Zealand (Alatini, 2009); and the more general injury prevention strategies 
from New Zealand’s Accident Compensation Corporation [ACC] (2005) and 
Britain’s Royal Society for the Prevention of Accidents [RoSPA] (2013).   
 As much as is possible (limitations outlined below) it is observed to what 
extent preventative measures identified in the literature have been successful 
through isolating critical differences in strategies. Preventative strategies are 
placed into the appropriate ‘E’ category –education, engineering, 
enforcement, and environment– and assessed for perceived effectiveness. It 
is during this process that the difficulties and paradoxes become apparent 
and buttress a central hypothesis: namely that the child accident or injury in 
risk society is simultaneously predictable and random (although the 
randomness is now ideally minimised if not eradicated), and it is because of 
this that prevention as such remains generally elusive and a challenging 
phenomenon to calibrate.    
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 An examination of the wider literature will identify common themes in 
the general discourse of child accident/injury prevention. While it is 
recognised that there are preventative strategies that appear to have achieved 
a measure of success (how ‘success’ is defined is problematic too) at the 
statistical level (the case for Sweden is persuasive), the limitations of 
epidemiological mapping are recognised in the tension between macro- and 
micro-forces, what statistics tell us and lived experiences, and predictability 
and chance.  
 Particular use will be made of Judith Green’s (1997a) Risk and 
misfortune: The social construction of accidents, which traces the changing 
conception(s) of the accident to its current day incarnation of a category 
which, in a society obsessed with calculating and managing risk, should not 
exist. Her work demonstrates, among many other things, the persistent 
disjuncture between theory and practice with regards to accident prevention. 
 
Methodology/Theoretical Framework 
 
As mentioned, measuring the effectiveness of child accident/injury 
prevention initiatives is an exercise in disconcertion. How can we know 
when an accident or unintentional injury has been prevented? While injury 
circumvention can ostensibly be measured in some cases, there is no way of 
measuring how many children did not have an accident who otherwise 
would have
6
. Nevertheless, research of this kind would seemingly begin with 
the statistical evidence, surmising causality or simply correlation, though 
whether a particular measure has prevented a particular child injury cannot 
be ascertained with certainty. It could potentially be inferred through causal, 
deductive reasoning, yet what might be ‘true’ at the general level may not be 
true for specific cases. 
 Initially it was anticipated that this study would walk a line between the 
formalism of traditional means of accident prevention and ‘risk’ research (in 
that there would be some utilisation of ‘rates’ and ‘statistics’) and a post-
modernist critique that largely eschews relevance. Such a line however, is 
redundant. As Green (1997a) outlines, an ‘accident’ is unequivocally defined 
with reference to social norms about responsibility. Therefore, statistics are 
unreliable in that they will only reflect that which was (selectively) socially 
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and legally defined as an accident at the time. Douglas (1967) asserts that 
official statistics are “…useless for the purpose to which they are put in 
sociological research – being merely tautological indicators of the subject 
under study” (cited in Green, 1997a, p. 86). If this study is to be a robust 
enquiry into child accident/injury prevention discourse and initiatives, the 
conventional, inclusive of the statistical, needs to be problematised and 
marginalised, so that alternative epistemologies may come to the fore. 
 Thus, this study bequeaths the child accident as a social fact to 
epidemiologists, and instead takes an approach that incorporates chance and 
contingency as legitimate areas of sociological enquiry; albeit, as Green 
(1997a) points out, areas that are potentially rather disturbing
7
. It does not 
seek to reveal the structured causes of child accidents and the effectiveness 
of preventative strategies so much as to assess the discursive determinations 
of normativity: How is the accident configured in risk society? How is 
prevention talked about? Whether particular preventative measures are 
effective will also be discussed, but as an issue that is necessarily 
problematised due to the definition of both ‘accident’ and ‘effectiveness’, 
the proposed solutions, and the existential difficulties of measuring 
‘prevention’. The most apposite theoretical basis for this study is a post-
structural one, which seeks, as does Foucault (Lye, 2008), to (re)instil an 
episteme of chance, discontinuity and materiality. 
 
The Accident 
 
In determining the connotations of the term ‘accident’, Friedrich Nietzsche’s 
‘effective history’ (cited in Fendler, 2010, p. 42) is edifying: instead of a 
mirror held up to the past in order to reveal ‘the truth’, Nietzsche employs a 
lever to excavate the ways in which truths have been constructed
8
. In 
employing this approach to conceptions of the accidental, there is no linear 
march towards a more progressive or total conception whereby earlier 
notions are thought to be deficient, primitive or strange, but rather 
recognition of the diversity and status of various conceptualisations, 
producing a genealogy that “de-naturalizes and exposes the strangeness of 
the present” (Macintosh, 2008, p. 3). Moreover, there is no singular view of 
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the accident at any given time, only contextual understandings, some of 
which are privileged over others.  
 Before the diffusion of western rationality, misfortunes were typically 
attributed to a metaphysical entity –witchcraft, the gods, ancestors– and thus 
had a reason for occurring (Evans-Pritchard, cited in Green, 1997a). The 
unfortunate event now known as the accident was either willed by spiritual 
forces or floated outside conceptual frameworks. According to Green 
(1997a), speaking of an accident became possible with the emergence of the 
European Enlightenment’s rationality and deterministic notions of direct 
cause and effect. Here, the accident became a ‘left-over’ category wherein 
causality could not be determined.   
 As Green (1997a) explains, this was to change with the rise of the notion 
of risk which stemmed from a fracturing of the consensus around 
rationality
9
. As the products of scientific advancement became problematic 
in their side effects and the race toward progress less assured (Sorensen & 
Christiansen, 2012), the accident became a prime site for analysis and 
calculation. With spiritual explanations long-rejected, and rational 
explanations rendering the accident inexplicable, unpredictable, and on the 
outer parameters of determinism, the accident, says Green (1997a), became 
subject to the newly mapped laws of probability. Here, random events 
become predictable. The accident could be, at least theoretically, 
comprehensible within a rationalist framework as more and more risk factors 
were teased out by the growing field of epidemiology. At the macro-level, 
the accident no longer ‘just happened’ with no need for further enquiry; the 
accident became a thing in-itself that could be predicted and thus prevented. 
If prevention failed, then someone, somewhere, had failed through 
negligence of the known risks, and that failure would need to be uncovered. 
The prevailing social construction of the accident shifted from being deemed 
by the gods, to a random unfortunate event, to, at this point within risk 
society, a preventable occurrence. The accident victim has similarly moved 
from being cursed, to being unlucky, to being interrogated and often 
blamed
10
.  
 However, Green’s (1997a) focus-group based studies of both adults’ and 
children’s stories about accidents paint a more ambiguous picture of the 
accident in regard to how such an event is conceived within everyday life. 
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For everyday people –mothers, children– the accident is simultaneously 
predictable (risks are calculated and managed) and unknowable (appeals to 
fate in that ‘accidents will happen’ or that some folk are just ‘accident 
prone’), which illustrates the uptake of a risk discourse sitting a little 
awkwardly alongside notions of the accident from previous eras. In 
accepting a discourse of risk management the discourse of individual 
responsibility is implicit. The contradictory view of the accident also 
demonstrates the split between theory and practice: what is theoretically 
calculable is not individually applicable. The accident can be predicted at the 
statistical level and precautions can be taken by individuals, yet given this, 
when an accident occurs despite precautions there can often be no 
explanation other than it ‘just happened’ –a ‘real’ accident. This occurs 
usually, Green (1997a) found, when responsibility for the accident cannot be 
isolated. She stresses that ‘lay’ people do not have an under-developed 
conception of the accident nor are they ignorant of the risks
11
. As it turns out 
their logic is similar to that of the professionals –she has noted similar 
ambiguities within professional accident prevention discourse, the law, and 
policy
12
. Perhaps, though, in everyday discourse the paradoxes are more 
apparent.  
 Accidents then, are a contextual, discursive construction. Green’s (1997a) 
qualitative research shows that they are events that we have to make sense of 
in personal terms, rather than as part of a population risk profile. Current 
usage of the term accident denotes a phenomenon that is both controllable 
and unwieldy; without blame yet apportionment of blame is usually sought; 
and predictable yet frustratingly enigmatic. The concepts of the controllable, 
blameworthy, and predictable as they sit within an explanatory framework of 
risk will now be appraised. 
 
Risk Society and the Accident: Ordering the Disordered 
 
Studies of risk, according to Green (1997a), have become something of a 
cottage industry –incorporating risk analysis, which is event and process-
driven, and social theory, which examines and critiques the construction of 
risk and safety– something of an ‘academic bricolage’. Those of the latter 
category conceptualise ‘risk society’ and describe how within late modernity 
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actions are organised in terms of perceived risks
13
 while risk analyses 
contribute to attempts to aggregate and mitigate such risks
14
. Those who 
theorise risk would charge those who analyse risk with reification: notions 
such as ‘safety’ and ‘accident’ have become things existent ‘out there’ 
separate from the individual and their social context. The risk society 
emerges when a negative side-effect of industrialised society comes to be, 
and is perceived as, an entity in and by itself (Sorensen & Christiansen, 
2012). In the same vein, Madge and Barker (2007) posit the notion of risk as 
a ‘floating signifier’ and suggest that the term has a more secure base than 
the behaviours and events it seeks to explain.  
 According to risk society theorists (Beck in particular) we have made the 
transition away from industrial society, wherein negative side effects were 
either ignored or unknown as progress was key, into the risk society, in 
which these side effects take up more and more discursive space. The risk 
society is one where uncertainty has re-entered, previously thought to have 
been banished by the triumph of science and rationality over the mystical 
and magical, but now present in the form of exposure to hazards produced 
by technological development (climate change, work-place accidents, car 
crashes). Such hazards cannot be allowed to remain unfathomable or 
unpredictable within a rational worldview however; they must become re-
configured as risks –uncertainties that are paradoxically rendered 
determinable and calculable. As Green (1997b) points out, the contemporary 
management and understanding of misfortune relies on our (perceived) 
ability to monitor and manipulate risks in most areas of our everyday lives. 
The supposition that the hazards we face can be quantified and managed 
underlies both the risk assessment industry and the discourse of individual 
responsibility.     
 In a society that is fixated by risk and its management, the accident is 
central: “That an accident has happened denotes that risk has not been 
adequately managed” (Green, 1997a, p. 13) and signifies supposedly 
residual irrationality. As Hacking (cited in Green, 2007) puts it, we have 
‘tamed chance’, so that accidents, like other seemingly random happenings, 
now sit within a “coherent framework of probabilistic understanding, and 
individual events become calculable as instances of aggregated trends” 
(Green, 2007, p. 32). Under this paradigm, the individual becomes a 
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‘constellation of risks’ to be monitored and regulated –by both the self and 
the ‘professionals’ (Castel, 1991). When an accident occurs, the individual is 
no longer just an unfortunate victim, but a repository for liability, negligence 
and epidemiological speculation. Contemporary child accident prevention 
literature asserts that child accidents are predictable and preventable. The 
term ‘accident’ therefore becomes inaccurate, so these occurrences are 
instead termed ‘unintentional injury’. 
 
Risk, Responsibility, and Anxiety  
 
In pre-rational times, unfortunate events had meaning and responsibility for 
them sat with the gods, the spirits or ‘fate’. Within rational modernity, the 
unfortunate event became an accident; it came to have no meaning in that it 
was just coincidence and ideally no-one could be held responsible. This 
meant there was a measure of sympathy for the victim –they were simply ‘in 
the wrong place at the wrong time’. The passage into risky times has seen 
meaning (or at least the search for it) re-enter the frame and responsibility is 
located with those who miscalculated or were ‘ignorant’ of the risks. 
Meaning is attached to finding out why the accident happened (i.e. who 
failed to take adequate precautions based on known risk factors), attributing 
responsibility, and seemingly trying to ensure it ‘doesn’t happen to anyone 
else’ (see Clarke & Van Amerom, 2007). This trajectory of implication and 
accountability traces the cultural curve into risk society, and demonstrates 
the existential need for certainty in a progressively more uncertain world, but 
how attempts to achieve that certainty –probabilistic calculations of random 
events– succeed in creating more uncertainty and anxiety.   
 Demonstrating how risk society’s model of probabilities is unable to 
achieve the certainty it craves and promises (and at times, demands), is Irish 
mathematician George Boole’s (1951) statement that    
 
(p)robability is expectation founded upon partial knowledge. A 
perfect acquaintance with all of the circumstances affecting the 
occurrence of an event would change expectation into certainty, and 
leave neither room nor demand for a theory of probabilities.  
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 It may be that a ‘perfect acquaintance’ with the confluence of factors that 
contribute to an individual accident is not possible within the theoretical 
sphere of probabilities, and even less so at the experiential level
15
. Thus, as 
Green (1997a) argues, mapping the rates of accidents does nothing to help 
predict any individual event.  
 Responsibility is crucial to framing the accident in risk society –an 
accident is genuine only if no culpability can be isolated. Yet even in such 
cases, culpability is pinned to not so much the will of an individual or group 
(accidents are ‘unintentional’), but to their lack of responsibility and 
negligence of the risks. The fact that an accident occurs in a universe where 
risks and preventative measures are known, means there has been a failure of 
risk calculation. Risk society, in its quest for certainty and order amid 
cumulative chaos, must punish ‘bad deeds’; not, as in earlier times, ‘bad 
thoughts or character’ (Leiter, 2013). For Nietzsche, all such morality is 
abhorrent, but necessary for what he sees as a certain stage of human 
character. Accidentality is the true character of everything that happens, 
according to Nietzsche, yet he despairs that  
 
(t)he ability and willingness of the human mind to grasp the 
accidental are both very limited. Our natural tendency is to interpret 
events in a way that provides an explanation, even a contrived one 
(Small, 2010, p. 42).  
 
 Green (1997a) suggests that the inability of rational explanatory systems 
to provide understanding for personal misfortune engenders a search for 
meaning. When no sense is found, rather than acceptance of the random, 
there is attribution of blame. Yet individuals were at one time not held 
responsible for their own –or their children’s– misfortunes, which evokes the 
‘strangeness’ and contingency of the present construction of the accident. 
Nietzsche (cited in Small, 2010, p. 36), in his disdain for the search for 
causality, contends that  
 
(w)herever responsibilities are sought, it is usually the instinct of 
wanting to judge and punish which is at work…the doctrine of the 
will has been invented essentially for the purpose of punishment, 
that is, because one wanted to impute guilt.  
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Child Accident/Injury Prevention: The Wider Literature 
 
The Three ‘E’s  
 
The three ‘E’s are a well-known framework within the accident/injury 
prevention sphere, in which most prevention strategies fall into one or a 
combination of these categories: Education, Enforcement, and 
Engineering. Educational initiatives aim to inform the public or targeted ‘at 
risk’ groups about potential risks and safety options and usually take the 
form of ‘awareness raising’ campaigns (advertisements depicting the effects 
of drink-driving or speeding). Enforcement initiatives use the legal system to 
influence both behaviour and the environment and typically involve 
regulations requiring the use of certain safety equipment and adherence to 
safety standards, with penalties enforced for non-compliance (compulsory 
use of seat-belts, bicycle helmets, car seats). Engineering initiatives use 
environmental and equipment design modifications to reduce the chance of 
an accident/injury event or to minimise injury by reducing the amount of 
energy to which someone is exposed (airbags, stair gates, street design). 
Engineering initiatives can be either active, where effort and repeated action 
is required by the user (using booster seats, installing and maintaining a 
working smoke alarm), or passive, which do not require any effort from the 
person being protected (fences, safety surfacing on playgrounds). Such 
passive engineering efforts form another ‘E’ category: Environment. The 
literature generally endorses environmental initiatives as the most effective – 
often in combination with enforcement as well as the more active 
engineering measures. Most suggest that effective injury prevention efforts 
require a combination of all the ‘E’s.  
 The literature demonstrates a long period of observation on the merits of 
accident prevention educational programmes, yet their success or otherwise 
remains inconclusive/elusive. For example, the 2001 UNICEF report A 
league table of child death by injury in rich nations: Innocenti report card 
shows that: 
 
It has rarely been possible to evaluate (these) individual 
interventions with any great precision. Because child injury deaths 
are rare events, studies of the effectiveness of safety campaigns 
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demand large sample sizes and prolonged evaluation periods. Add to 
this the fact that any one measure can seldom be isolated from other 
social and environmental changes and it is easy to see why hard 
evidence for the effectiveness of these different safety campaigns is 
hard to secure (UNICEF, 2001, p. 12).  
  
 The report goes on to document what can be proven to reduce the 
likelihood and severity of child injury, pointing to measures such as drink-
driving laws,  safer car design, the use of child seats and rear seat restraints, 
the wearing of cycle helmets, childproof packaging of pharmaceuticals and 
safety standards for toys and games, safety glass, window bars, stair gates, 
playground safety standards, the fencing of swimming pools, and campaigns 
to ensure that most young children learn to swim. All but the last of these 
initiatives are ones of Engineering, Enforcement, or changing the physical 
Environment. Learn to swim campaigns, while Educational in nature, 
provide not just information but a practical, primary preventative skill.  
 The majority of the current literature reaches similar conclusions with 
regards to proven efficacy. Despite this, most persist in recommending 
educational strategies. This can be partially explained by the findings of 
UNICEF’s (2001, p. 23), Innocenti report card wherein a table was 
presented evaluating road safety measures that had proved effective in 
developed nations. It established that overall, educational initiatives had the 
least efficacy, but were the most affordable and feasible. Part of this lack of 
efficacy was explained by the difficulty of measuring the outcomes of 
educational initiatives. While enhanced levels of knowledge can be 
ascertained, any reduction in the accident/injury rate cannot be demonstrably 
linked to that enhanced awareness.  
 A further explanation for the persistence of educational strategies despite 
their lack of proven effectiveness is one advanced by risk theorists. Both 
Beck (1992) and Giddens (1991) maintain that since the latter half of the 
twentieth century, responsibility for the management of risk has increasingly 
become a privatised activity. As Green (1997a) points out, risk society has 
diffused responsibility for safety from ‘experts’ to individuals. Here, 
accident prevention is not so much a public good, but an individual 
responsibility. As educational strategies typically address individual actions, 
they are deemed to be the most appropriate and ‘successful’. For Green 
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(1997a), the focus on education in child accident prevention serves to mask 
the structural inequalities that pattern accident rates and instead utilise a 
‘victim blaming’ ideology. Further, it hinders the development of collective 
action and reinforces the construction of parents as having the sole 
responsibility for the safety of their children.  
 One organisation that exemplifies the individualisation or ‘privatisation’ 
of risk and safety is Great Britain’s Royal Society for the Prevention of 
Accidents
16
 (RoSPA). In their publication The big book of accident 
prevention (2013), the authors imply it should be evident to everyone that 
“Accidental injury prevention is low cost and high impact. It is easy to 
deliver (there is a well-worn pathway of best practice) and it is broadly 
welcomed by the people it helps” (p. 3). The preventative methods referred 
to are focussed on information and education, and in a departure from the 
general consensus around what is effective, RoSPA sees educational 
programmes as one of the proven and most effective forms of public health 
intervention
17
. Education is the preferred strategy not only due to its 
relatively low cost, but arguably because it is a good fit for the discourse of 
individualism. With an emphasis on the disadvantaged, RoSPA declares 
that: “People need to be empowered (through knowledge) to make their own 
safety decisions. After that, they should be expected to take responsibility 
for themselves and their loved ones” (p. 24).  
 While the publication presents case studies to demonstrate how specific 
injuries can be successfully prevented through the use of safety programmes, 
evaluation relies on reported satisfaction with the programmes and levels of 
knowledge. Where statistics are used to try to demonstrate a causal link 
between a drop in injury rates –hospital admissions were used– and the 
success of safety programmes, all that can be surmised is that the reduction 
in the annual rise of hospital admissions
18
 “appears to have been the result of 
the programme”.  If any link could be made, it could possibly be due to the 
fact that the safety programme included the provision of free safety 
equipment (safety gates, fire guards, cupboard locks, bath mats and blind 
cord shorteners) which constitute the more substantiated environmental and 
engineering strategies.  
 Overall, the literature is in accord with the perceived efficacy of 
accident/injury prevention measures that change the physical environment. 
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These measures are primary in nature
19
 and as such form the crux of accident 
prevention. The literature is also largely in agreement with the notion that all 
‘E’s should be used in combination for maximum effectiveness. While there 
are those (RoSPA) who in general recommend purely educational initiatives, 
most endorse education as a supplement to environmental, engineering and 
enforcement initiatives
20
. It is within these multi-fold accident/injury 
prevention enterprises that education is seen to be most helpful.   
 
Salient Findings/Themes/Recommendations 
 
 Accidents are preventable 
 
Along with the major finding that environmental modification is the most 
effective method of preventing childhood accidents, perhaps the most 
obvious theme across the literature is the notion that accidents are 
preventable –an idea that underpins the existence of accident prevention 
organisations situated within a discourse of risk. Of the reports examined, 
almost all were initiated with a statement emphasising the predictability and 
preventability of accidents/injuries. Incorporating an educational approach, 
the first objective of the New Zealand injury prevention strategy 2005/08 
implementation plan is to “Raise awareness and acceptance that most 
injuries can be prevented” (ACC, 2005, p. 10), while the United States’ 
National action plan for child injury prevention (NCIPC-CDC, 2012) asserts 
that “These (child) deaths and injuries need not occur, because they often 
result from predictable events”. RoSPA’s (2013) The big book of accident 
prevention is more confident, proclaiming/imploring that “Accidents are 100 
per cent preventable, so why not prevent them” (p. 5)? In comparing child 
injury rates across OECD nations, with Sweden’s being the lowest, 
UNICEF’s (2001) Innocenti report card somewhat redundantly states that 
“At least 12,000 child deaths a year could be prevented if all OECD 
countries had the same child injury death rate as Sweden” (p. 2). Alatini for 
Safekids New Zealand (2009, p. 11) concurs that “most unintentional 
injuries are predictable and therefore preventable”.  
 With the exception of RoSPA, the organisational literature accepts that 
not all accidents are preventable, yet it is regularly reiterated that most are. 
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Which accidents then, are not preventable? Real accidents? The 
contemporary definition of a ‘real’ accident is slippery: the space in which 
‘real’ accidents occur is diminished by increasing the domain of the known 
and patterned (Green, 1997a), yet it would seem even here there is a ‘left-
over’ category that sits outside the explanatory framework of risk. 
Demonstrating the disjuncture between the statistical and individual levels, 
the problems with measuring prevention, and the implication of blame is 
Alatini’s (2009) statement that “For some families, the emotional pain (of 
losing a child through accidental injury) is even greater if simple measures 
could have been taken to prevent the incident” (p. 14). If ‘most unintentional 
injuries are predictable and preventable’, why has this ‘incident’ occurred? It 
is either one of the ‘left-overs’ that was not predictable or preventable, or, 
the implication is, the family must have been ignorant and/or negligent. If 
simple measures could have been taken to prevent the incident, then why 
were they not taken? Attempting to determine these ‘simple measures’ after 
the fact serves only to apportion blame and heighten feelings of individual 
guilt.   
 
 A more unified effort 
 
The literature posits a need for a cohesive, integrated approach to child 
accident/injury prevention. The consensus is that in any given nation (except 
Sweden…) there are too many agencies involved in child accident/injury 
prevention and that one main co-ordinating agency is required in order to 
implement broad strategies based on evidence. As the European report on 
child injury prevention (WHO, 2008) points out, Sweden was the first to 
recognise the importance of injuries as a threat to child health and to tackle 
the problem in a co-ordinated manner. Sweden has the lowest child 
accident/injury rate in the world, which the WHO report attributes to 
Swedish society’s sense of corporate/collective responsibility; allowing a 
culture of safety to be nurtured and the protection of children to become a 
key societal goal.  
 The reports are unanimous in the assertion that we already know what 
works
21
, but that child safety has not been fiscally and collectively 
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prioritised
22 
and preventative efforts are typically piecemeal, making them 
generally unsuccessful and difficult to measure.  
 
 Those most ‘at risk’ 
 
Not only do all the reports point to poverty/disadvantage as the single 
biggest risk factor, but many comment that this fact has been a common 
finding of previous research and that attempts to address it have been sorely 
underdeveloped. Other common risk indicators or correlations identified 
include gender, with boys having a higher incidence of injury; family size, 
with larger families more likely to experience child injury; lack of maternal 
education; single parenthood; unemployment; poor housing; and parental 
drug or alcohol abuse. As all of these factors (aside from gender) are closely 
associated with poverty, it seems the continual mapping of these risk 
indicators is a largely futile exercise. While some of the literature simply 
restates the salience of poverty in child accident/injury prevention research 
findings, others endeavour to address it specifically and prioritise it in their 
objectives and recommendations. UNICEF’s (2001) Innocenti report card 
states, “…it is not difficult to see why economic poverty alone would 
increase risks to children”, and points to proven risk-reducing interventions23 
that would benefit the under-privileged population that are not being 
implemented. While many of the recommendations that address the unequal 
distribution of child accident/injury sit within the existing framework of 
education (and increasingly, the new ‘E’ that reflects the redress of 
disadvantage – empowerment), there are some that go further. The European 
report on child injury (WHO, 2008) for instance, has this to say: 
 
Making children’s environments inherently safer by using passive 
safety countermeasures can reverse the social inequities in injury. 
These interventions tackle the physical exposures that put children at 
risk. For example, ameliorating material deprivation at home by 
providing better housing and modifying the traffic environment to 
ensure that children are not exposed to dangerous situations have 
been shown to result in fewer injuries, thereby reducing the safety 
differentials between social groups (p. 3).  
 
262 Campbell & Cowley – Child Accident/Injury Prevention 
 
 
 As it stands, the pervasive relationship between poverty and child 
accident/injury is seen as at the cutting edge of child accident/injury 
prevention. The broad consensus in the literature is that this area is under-
researched
24
 and suffering from a chronic lack of dissemination of proven 
preventative measures. The literature is in accord that if the factors that lead 
to the high accident/injury rate among the disadvantaged are addressed, the 
overall rate will reduce considerably.   
 
Problems with Prevention 
 
At the surface level, the notion of accident prevention seems to serve to 
reduce uncertainty and anxiety by constructing the accident as an occurrence 
that can be predicted –in theory. If it can be predicted, the logic follows that 
it need not happen. As noted previously, the prevention of child 
accidents/injuries in the developed world has become a primary health 
concern for professionals, built up over the latter half of the 20
th
 century. 
The case of Sweden demonstrates how a concerted, sustained, collective 
effort involving all of the three ‘E’s (with emphasis on the environment) can 
reduce the child accident/injury rate
25
. Yet, prevention remains problematic 
on several levels. The first is the disjuncture between what is known at the 
statistical level and what occurs ‘on the ground’. While Sweden has 
achieved an impressive reduction in its child accident/injury rate over the 
last 50 years, accidents and injuries naturally still occur (Jansson et al., 
2006). Furthermore, the discourse that posits individual accidents/injuries as 
essentially preventable –through charting risk factors and taking 
precautions– in effect serves to increase anxiety. While statistics can display 
a change in the rate and analysis of that can (attempt to) pinpoint causality, 
at the individual level a different kind of sense must be made when accidents 
inevitably occur.  
 Another problem with prevention is the persistence of educational 
strategies despite scant evidence of their efficacy –perhaps indicating that 
both policy makers and researchers have reached somewhat of an impasse. If 
the objective is a reduction in the accident/injury rate, and the most effective 
strategies have been consistently identified as environmental, then the 
implementation of ‘more education’ can only inhibit that aim. 
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Demonstrating this perversity is New Zealand’s Accident Compensation 
Corporation’s (ACC) recent announcement that its largely educational 
prevention scheme has not been “having great impact” (ACC admits multi-
million dollar prevention scheme failing, 2014), yet funding for its 
programmes is about to double to $40 million.    
 The effectiveness of preventative strategies, particularly those of an 
educational nature, will always be difficult to measure as there is an absence 
of tangibility. Added to that is the myriad of forces, both physical and social, 
that can converge at any time to produce an ‘unfavourable occurrence’. 
Moreover, if a particular accident has not happened, there is no way of 
knowing at the individual level that it has been prevented
26
.    
 
From Accident to Injury: Erasure 
 
Green’s (1997a) discussion of the history of the accident notes the 
contemporary unease about the ‘accidental’ as a valid explanation for 
misfortune. It carries with it connotations of an arbitrary process, something 
unknowable and ‘primitive’ which society has outgrown. Chance events 
have been rendered predictable; thus the accident, as an event devoid of 
volition and clarity, no longer has a legitimate place. As Green (1997a, p. 
112) points out, health professionals have long objected to the term 
‘accident’, suggesting that it is “…somehow contaminated by ‘lay’ 
associations of an unwilled and unknowable process”, citing one 
professional, Doege, who in 1978 proclaimed that it was “…time for 
medicine to dispose of the ‘accident’” given that it is an “…ambivalent, 
misleading anachronism” (ibid).  Another professional suggests that “…the 
word accident (should be replaced) by a more objective and crisp word” 
(Evans, 1993, cited in Green, 1997a, p. 112).  
 Presciently, in 1983 a field of ‘injury control’, rather than ‘accident 
prevention’ was advocated, which would focus on injuries as a result of the 
transfer of energy, enabling an “epidemiological model of human damage” 
(Roberts, cited in Green, 1997a, p. 112). In 2001 the demise of the accident 
became official when the British Medical Journal (BMJ) banned the use of 
the term, pointing out that accidents are not synonymous with injuries, but 
are instead “injury producing events” (Davis & Pless, 2001, p. 1320).  The 
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journal decided to lead the way in rectifying the ‘misuse’ of the term 
‘accident’, as the BMJ is “…a leading communicator in medicine (and) 
needs to establish or follow standards in language” (ibid). The function of 
this new standard in language is to leave no doubt that “most injuries and 
their precipitating events are predictable and preventable” –they are not 
chance occurrences or ‘acts of God’.  
 The current focus on injury prevention rather than accident prevention 
reflects the transformation of the ‘random accident’ into the ‘preventable 
accident’ –an oxymoron. A benign explanation for this shift is that it is 
recognition that accidents are not preventable, but injuries are, and that the 
BMJ’s transparent amendment to language serves to correct the misuse of 
the term ‘accident’ when ‘injury’ would be more appropriate. A more critical 
explanation – one that draws on Foucault –is that it is a logophobic27 attempt 
to control the ‘dangerous elements’ of the unrestrained discourse of ‘lay’ 
people. Here, attempts to control discourse mask a fear of disorder (Lye, 
2008). This shift is a way of erasing the accident, the ultimate disorderin a 
society that has convinced itself it has command of chance. Foucault (in 
Fendler, 2010), applies Nietzsche’s archaeological method in order to 
excavate historical trajectories –not to uncover truths, but to identify changes 
in discourse. With gratitude to the BMJ, the authors of this paper have not 
had to ‘dig’ too much to locate this particular discursive shift.  
 
Conclusion 
 
“We don’t live in a world that suffers from doubt, but one that suffers from 
certainty, false certainties that compensate for the well of worldly anxieties 
and worries.”  
 – Les Back, The art of listening. 
 
The only accident that is not preventable now, the discourse implies, is the 
‘ideal’ accident –an occurrence lacking implications of responsibility, 
motivation or prior knowledge. Yet the accident, ideal or otherwise, is 
increasingly non-existent. Now wholly subject to the laws of probability, 
risk society’s raison d’être, the accident is predictable on a magnified scale. 
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A preventable, predictable event cannot be properly termed an accident; 
therefore the focus has shifted from the event to the injuries it produces. 
 With regards to child accident/injury prevention, efforts in Sweden have 
proven successful in reducing the child accident/injury rate, reportedly due 
to a collectivised, cohesive, sustained programme with a focus on creating 
environmental barriers to injury. Other developed-world nations repeatedly 
refer and aspire to Sweden’s success, yet preventative measures in other 
nations are typically piecemeal, detached from research and proven practice, 
overly focussed on education programmes, and to a certain extentirrational 
in the underpinning logic of preventability.  
 The knowability with which risk society frames the accident ostensibly 
serves to reduce uncertainty –something which humans by and large find 
discomfiting. However, the concepts of predictability and preventability in 
effect raise levels of anxiety as constant vigilance and assessment is required 
for an ever-increasing pattern of risks. Anxiety levels are increased too by 
the apportionment of blame when the (contradictory) predictable and 
preventable accident occurs.  
 The critiques contained in this paper are not intended to discount the 
efforts of accident/injury prevention professionals. Rather, it is hoped that 
the discussion will demonstrate the ways in which contemporary cultural 
concerns such as uncertainty and responsibility are inherent in the accident’s 
construction (or deconstruction, as the case may be). Areas that have not 
been covered in depth, such asdisadvantage, gender, ethnicity and the 
distribution of risk; non-western cultural constructions of the accident; the 
world of insurance; the legal implications of the accident; and the 
‘overprotection’ of children have significant potential for further critical 
study.  
 That which is known for certain is subject to material deterministic laws 
of cause and effect. At the statistical level, knowledge of risk is determined 
by the laws of probability in an attempt to establish certainty. At a local or 
individual level however, when it comes to the accidental there is little that 
can be known for sure. This is our paradox.  
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Notes 
 
1 Sociology has been concerned with industrial accidents and large-scale disasters (e.g. 
Perrow, 1984; Matthewman, 2012), but not so much with accidents at the micro-level. 
2 UNICEF, 2001.   
3 The use of the term ‘accident’ hasbeen something of a misnomer – one of its main uses has 
been to describe the outcome of an accident, which is often an injury. Using the term ‘injury’ 
may indeed be more accurate in these instances. The accident is the event or incident, the 
injury is the outcome. 
4 Although maybe this is too ambitious within a western rationalist discourse – Paul 
Feyerabend in Farewell to reason (1988) suggests that other worldviews may have a more 
‘functional’ approach to accidents. 
5 Yet to do so would turn the accident prevention industry on its head. 
6 Although attempts have been made – see for example UNICEF’s (2001) Innocenti report 
card. 
7 See theorists such as Michel Foucault (1972); Nietzsche (1887); and Richard Rorty (1982, 
1989).  
8 Nietzsche expounded this approach in On the genealogy of morals (1887), one that has 
greatly informed Foucault’s genealogical and archaeological style of historical enquiry. 
9 Although as Green (1997a) notes, for Foucault there was no single or comprehensive 
rationality – it was always already fractured. 
10 In the case of children it is their parents/caregivers who are subject to interrogation and 
blame. 
11 See the project undertaken with the Corkerhill community in Glasgow (Roberts, Smith, & 
Bryce, 1993). 
12 See too Reeve’s (2006) examination of the split between macro- and micro-factors in child 
injury research and prevention in New Zealand. 
13 Notably Beck (1992) and Giddens (1991). 
14 See for example the child accident prevention literature that will be inspected later. 
15 Especially if “…disorder is far more probable than order” (Cole, 1998, p.134). 
16 Of the literature reviewed, RoSPA’s is the only publication that uses the now professionally 
anachronistic term ‘accident’ instead of ‘injury’. 
17 Despite inadequate evidence. 
18 The Safe at Home programme was targeted to children under 5 who were deemed ‘at risk’, 
yet the hospital admissions data examined post-programme encompassed unintentional injury 
admissions for all age groups. 
19 Injury prevention involves primary prevention, which aims to prevent the injury event 
(accident) in the first place; secondary prevention, which seeks to reduce the risk of injury 
once an event has occurred; and tertiary prevention, which aims to minimise the 
consequences of an injury (WHO, 2008). 
20 A car seat safety campaign coupled with legislation making them compulsory and safer car 
seat design is one example of a threefold initiative. Subsidised or free car seat rental is a 
further strategy that has been added to this for extra effectiveness. 
21 With the exception of RoSPA, which advocates an educational approach to accident 
prevention, it is widely accepted that environmental measures, encompassing engineering and 
enforcement initiatives, have been substantiated as the most effective. 
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22 Again, with the exception of RoSPA, which advocates an individual approach to accident 
prevention. 
23 Such as Sweden’s comprehensive programme. 
24 Although the value of more research is a contradictory arena – most organisations, while 
recommending further research, also agree enough is already known to implement effective 
preventative strategies for ‘at risk’ groups. 
25 See Why does Sweden have the lowest childhood injury mortality rate in the world? The 
roles of architecture and public pre-school services (Jansson, De Leon, Ahmed, & Jansson, 
2006); and Sweden’s experience in reducing childhood injuries (Bergman & Rivara, 1991). 
26 This absurdity was highlighted when Charles Dickens announced one December that he 
could not travel by train any more that year, “on the grounds that the average annual quota of 
railroad accidents in Britain had not been filled and therefore further disasters were obviously 
imminent” (Cole, 1998, p. 30). 
27 Logophobia is a Foucauldian concept that denotes a fear of the mass of spoken things (Lye, 
2008). 
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